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North Korea is one of the most heavily-sanctioned states in the world. Indeed, since the 
breakdown of negotiations after the Leap Day Agreement in 2012, sanctions have become 
the primary means whereby the United States, its allies and the broader international 
community via the United Nations Security Council have sought to exert pressure on the 
North Korean regime. Increasingly stringent sanctions have, however, failed to dissuade 
Pyongyang from developing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or from engaging in 
illicit activities designed to support their development. As the broader literature on 
international sanctions suggests, this failure should not be surprising. Sanctions analysts 
have long argued that target states find it relatively easy to circumvent sanctions, and that 
sanctions can actually serve to strengthen rather than undermine the domestic political 
authority of the target state.  
 
More recently, however, a more optimistic body of literature has emerged that has 
enthusiastically celebrated financial sanctions as an effective means of imposing broad 
economic costs on targeted states (Zarate 2013; Arnold 2016; Torbat 2005; Loeffler 2009). 
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Such measures work by explicitly proscribing third party banks from engaging in financial 
dealings with target state entities, and more broadly, by enforcing global norms and 
standards on international banks regardless of their geographical location. Banks that fail to 
adhere to these standards face the possibility of being shut out of the dollar-based 
international financial system. As such, the potential profits to be made through sanctions 
evasion are outweighed by the costs of being labelled a "money-laundering concern." Here, 
the case of North Korea has frequently been cited as a successful instance of this approach. 
The US Treasury's action against Macao's Banco Delta Asia (BDA) in 2005 ostensibly 
demonstrated the extent to which it was possible to exert pressure on a third-party private 
financial entity to cut its ties with so-called “rogue regimes.” As Juan Zarate notes, as a 
result of the actions against BDA, "... North Korea found its bank accounts and illicit 
financial activity in jeopardy. A North Korean deputy negotiator at the time quietly 
admitted to a senior White House official, 'You finally found a way to hurt us'" (Zarate 
2013). 
 
In this article, we challenge this optimistic assessment of financial sanctions through a re-
examination of the North Korean case. On the one hand, the case for North Korea as 
testament to the efficacy of financial sanctions is undermined by the straightforward fact 
that the strengthening of those sanctions and the isolation of the country from the 
international financial system has not led to any significant macroeconomic impact on the 
North Korean economy. Conversely, the strengthening of financial sanctions has coincided 
with an increase in North Korea's external trade and gradual improvement in several 
industrial sectors. This challenges the case for financial sanctions since although such 
measures are in the first instance aimed at targeting illicit financial dealings, their 
effectiveness is also deemed to be related to the fact that they are able to isolate the target 
state completely from the international financial system and, by doing so, exert 
considerable economic pressure on the target state.  
 
This argument is made through an analysis of the relationship between financial sanctions 
and the Sino-North Korean border economy. The reasons for this focus are twofold. First, it 
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is no exaggeration to say that the Sino-North Korean border economy has become central to 
North Korea’s economic survival. As our analysis suggests, however, financial sanctions 
are, as with more traditional and smart sanctions, susceptible to evasive strategies. Our 
focus on the Sino-North Korean border economy is also advantageous in methodological 
terms. In contrast to more overtly illicit activities aimed at supporting Pyongyang’s WMD 
programme, it is considerably easier to conduct a reliable analysis of North Korea's external 
economic relations through examining Chinese customs statistics and conducting field 
research in the Chinese border regions.
2
 Indeed, the fact that Sino-North Korean trade now 
accounts for the vast majority of North Korea's total external trade means that the impact of 
financial sanctions on the country can be more accurately examined. Specifically, we ask 
the question of what impact financial sanctions have had on methods of trade settlement 
and transactions within the border economy. As we argue, the failure of financial sanctions 
to exert any discernible macroeconomic pressure on the North Korea economy is largely a 
result of the manner in which they have encouraged the use of cash and barter in trade 
settlement as well as the persistence of certain forms of smuggling. Moreover, the 
tightening of financial sanctions has also meant that North Korean financial institutions 
have themselves increasingly utilised informal cross-border networks. The case study of the 
Sino-North Korean border economy thus challenges the optimism of the financial sanctions 
literature and calls for greater consideration of how actors are able to deploy strategies of 
evasion. 
 
Before we proceed, it is necessary to briefly discuss issues relating to the generalisability of 
the case study. On the one hand, the failure of financial sanctions to have any marked 
impact on North Korean elites' might not come as a surprise to the majority of sanctions 
analysts. The authoritarian nature of the regime, the apparent elite unity over the pursuit of 
nuclear weapons, and the limited nature of the country's integration into the global 
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economy all serve to make North Korea a least likely case for the efficacy of conventional 
sanctions. Our objective here, however, is to analyse the prior issue of the impact of 
sanctions on the target state's external relations and the failure of financial sanctions to 
exert economic pressure on the country's leadership. Clearly the case study possesses a 
number of idiosyncratic features. For example, China's lax enforcement of trade sanctions 
is often considered to be central to the broader failure of international sanctions against 
North Korea. The financial sanctions literature claims, however, that such measures are 
capable of enforcing compliance of otherwise reluctant third party countries. This, 
combined with the prominence of North Korea within the broader literature on financial 
sanctions, serves to  underline the importance of the case study with regards to debates 
concerning the efficacy of financial sanctions. 
 
From Trade to Financial Sanctions  
 
The mainstream sanctions debate has produced a sizable literature focusing on the question 
of whether sanctions are effective tools of statecraft or not. “Effectiveness” here is 
understood to denote the extent to which sanctions are capable of altering the behaviour of 
the target state, or more ambitiously, of facilitating regime change within the target state 
(Hufbauer et al. 1990; Pape 1997; 1998; Elliott 1998). Commonly regarded as 
representative of the optimistic camp in terms of the effectiveness of sanctions, Hufbauer et 
al. conducted a study of 115 cases of largely trade-based sanctions between 1914 and 1990, 
and found that sanctions were at least partially successful in just 34 per cent of all the cases. 
As such, they concluded that sanctions are of limited utility in achieving foreign policy 
goals aimed at compelling a target country to take actions it resists, though they noted that 
the success rate varied in accordance with the type of policy or governmental change 
sought (Hufbauer et al. 1990, pp.92–93). Other accounts have argued that even this analysis 
overstates the success rate of sanctions. Robert Pape, for example, re-examined Haufbauer 
et al.'s database and argued that almost none of the claimed 40 cases of effective economic 
sanctions can realistically be interpreted as "successful." According to Pape's analysis, 18 
of Hufbauer et al.'s cases were in reality settled either by the direct or indirect use of force. 
In a further eight cases, Pape found that there was no evidence that the target state made the 
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demanded concessions, six cases did not qualify as instances of economic sanctions, and a 
further three were indeterminate. As a result, only five of Hufbauer et al.'s 115 cases can 
properly be regarded as "successes" (Pape 1997, p.93).   
 
There are many reasons for the low efficacy of trade-based sanctions. These include, for 
example, the relative ease with which target states are able to evade sanctions. In Galtung's 
study of Rhodesia in the 1960s, the latter's extensive land borders and opportunities for 
smuggling played a key role in undermining the impact of multilateral sanctions (Galtung 
1967, p.398). Indeed, as Hufbauer et al. themselves point out, "... a sieve leaks like a 
sanction. Ingenious new trading relationships, devised by domestic and third-country firms, 
flower because it is difficult to trace the origin and destination of traded goods" (Hufbauer 
et al. 1990, p.106). Such evasion strategies may also have more deleterious outcomes. In 
the case of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the 1990s, for example, trade-based 
sanctions contributed to the criminalisation of the state, economy, and civil society of both 
the targeted country and its immediate neighbours, thereby fostering a symbiosis between 
political leaders, organised crime, and transnational smuggling networks (Andreas 2005). 
Comprehensive trade sanctions have also been criticised due to their excessive human costs, 
as demonstrated in Iraq during the 1990s (Halliday 1999). Indeed, the fact that it was 
military action that ultimately toppled Saddam Hussein only served to increase the general 
pessimism towards trade sanctions as a tool of foreign policy.  
 
The poor record of trade sanctions at achieving their stated objectives as well as their 
significant secondary effects led in the 1990s to a shift in emphasis towards so-called 
"smart sanctions" that include measures such as travel bans and asset freezes that are 
directed more towards key individuals in the target regime leadership (Cortright & Lopez 
2002). Smart sanctions have, however, similarly come under increasing critical scrutiny in 
recent years. This is in part a result of the questionable theoretical assumptions that 
underpin them. As Lee Jones has argued, comprehensive trade sanctions were founded on 
the liberal understanding of human subjects as rational utility maximisers and the related 
assumption that if sanctions produced enough suffering within the target society, popular 
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discontent would force the ruling elite to change their policies. Smart sanctions, on the 
other hand, reverse that assumption in viewing human subjects as incapable of exerting 
pressure on their governments and as vulnerable victims of the regime (L. Jones 2015, 
p.19). However, it has been argued that the very fact that smart sanctions do not aim to 
impose significant costs on the target economy means that they have been even less 
successful in generating policy concessions than comprehensive embargoes (Drezner 2015). 
As such, the fact that smart sanctions have not proved demonstrably more effective than 
traditional sanctions (Elliott 2002) has contributed to increased pessimism towards such 
measures.    
 
An exception to this pessimistic view of sanctions efficacy has been the increased 
popularity of financial sanctions in the post-9/11 era, which are deemed capable of 
inflicting considerable costs on the economies of target states (Torbat 2005). Financial 
sanctions work by pressuring banks rather than governments to act as agents of 
international isolation. Typically, the US Treasury issues watch lists and banks are then 
expected to block suspected assets and transactions, thereby cutting individuals and 
organisations off from the global financial system. Reputational concerns regarding the  
danger of being labelled a "money laundering concern" mean that even non-US banks have 
strong motivations to adhere to Treasury watch lists even when they are not required to do 
so by domestic or international law (Loeffler 2009).  
 
As such, the efficacy of financial sanctions is understood to stem from the hegemonic 
position that the US occupies in global finance. As Drezner notes, international actors need 
access to US capital markets and particularly to US dollars in order to conduct cross-border 
transactions. This access matters more to banks and non-bank financial actors than any 
potential profit that may come from violating Treasury warnings. This means that whereas 
market forces tend to weaken trade-based sanctions, they serve to strengthen financial 
sanctions (Drezner 2015). Thus, as Zarate has argued, financial sanctions have become 
indispensable in targeting and isolating rogue regimes and actors whose criminal behaviour 
poses a security threat to the US and have redefined the way the US government engages in 
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financial warfare (Zarate 2013). Furthermore, given their claimed effectiveness, they have 
increasingly been multilateralised through their inclusion in UN Security Council 
resolutions (Eckert 2008, p.104). 
 
In the emerging literature, North Korea has frequently been cited as a successful case of the 
use of financial sanctions. As noted in the introduction, in September 2005, the US 
Treasury accused Macao's Banco Delta Asia of facilitating North Korean money laundering 
as well as trafficking in counterfeit currency. This accusation alone led the Macao banking 
authorities to freeze 52 North Korean accounts worth US$ 24 million. Although the amount 
involved was not particularly large, this led to a run on the bank's deposits by its other 
customers. In the longer term, it made foreign businesses and banks increasingly wary of 
having any dealings with North Korea, even with regards to legal business ventures, for 
fear of being designated complicit in North Korean money laundering (Klingner 2007). 
This was indeed the intended effect of the Treasury's action against the BDA. Following the 
accusations against the bank, Senior Treasury Department officials travelled the world to 
meet with their foreign counterparts and with foreign bankers to warn them of the risks of 
doing business with North Korea. Around two dozen financial institutions in Asia and 
Europe subsequently began to close down or limit their North Korean bank accounts 
(Wertz 2013, pp.73–74). 
 
Framed as aimed at “safeguarding the international financial system,” these measures had a 
devastating impact on North Korea's ability to engage with the global financial system. Due 
to the resulting pressure on North Korea, it has been claimed that the BDA designation was 
successful in bringing the country back to negotiations over Pyongyang’s WMD 
programme (Eckert 2008). As Arnold (2016) notes, the US government's designation of 
BDA as a money laundering concern had initially derailed an agreement made a month 
earlier to abandon Pyongyang’s nuclear programme and to rejoin the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty. However, this derailment was only temporary. Washington subsequently agreed to 
release the frozen funds and to ease sanctions more broadly, thereby reviving the stalled 
diplomacy and encouraging North Korea to begin disabling its Yongbyon nuclear plant. 
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Though the Six Party Talks broke down again in late 2008, Arnold argues that "... it was 
clear that the financial sanctions had prevented the regime of Kim Jong-il from financing its 
illicit activities" (Arnold 2016). Indeed, as Zarate argues, the cutting of funding flows to 
countries such as North Korea can restrict their ability to operate and force them to make 
not only budget decisions, but also strategic choices (Zarate 2013). 
 
Pyongyang’s continuation of nuclear and missile tests in 2016 suggests that the ability of 
financial sanctions to dissuade Pyongyang from pursuing its WMD programme has been 
exaggerated. More crucially, however, financial sanctions have failed to exert any tangible 
macroeconomic impact on the country’s economy at all. Instead, the strengthening of 
financial sanctions against North Korea has coincided with the gradual recovery of the 
economy amidst the expansion of its economic ties with China. Comprehensive Japanese 
and South Korean trade embargoes along with China's own economic rise and the related 
boom in global commodity prices have massively expanded the role of the Sino-North 
Korean border economy in North Korea's external economic relations. This border 
economy is characterised by a vast network of informal trade based on smuggling, barter, 
and the use of cash for trade settlement and investment. These informal strategies serve 
both as a means of evading sanctions as well as avoiding customs duties and cumbersome 
procedures. They also reflect the fact that financial sanctions have undermined attempts by 
the Chinese government to establish a more robust cross-border financial system. As such, 
we argue for more nuanced analysis of how financial sanctions are contingent upon geo-
economic specificities and are, as with other forms of sanctions, susceptible to evasive 
practices. We proceed by examining how financial sanctions have been situated within a 
broader array US, Japanese, South Korean, and multilateral UNSC sanctions. 
 
Bilateral and Multilateral Sanctions Against North Korea 
 
Sanctions applied to North Korea include a range of bilateral and multilateral measures. 
The US, for example, has for nearly seven decades applied stringent bilateral trade 
sanctions against North Korea on a number of pretexts including North Korea's activities 
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related to the proliferation of WMD, regional provocations, terrorism, narcotics trafficking, 
undemocratic governance, and illicit activities such as money laundering, the counterfeiting 
of goods and currency, and bulk cash smuggling (Rennack 2011, p.1). The earliest 
sanctions date back to the outbreak of the Korean War, when the Export Control Act of 
1949 was applied to North Korea, imposing a total embargo on US exports to the country. 
The Export-Import Bank Act of 1945, which denies guarantees, insurance, credit or other 
Bank programmes to Marxist-Leninist countries, was also applied. Furthermore, the 
Trading with the Enemy Act was implemented in December 1950 to freeze North Korean 
assets under US jurisdiction and place broader restrictions on US trade and investment 
relations with the country. The 1951 Trade Agreement Extension Act prohibited giving 
Most Favoured Nation status to North Korea, thereby effectively blocking the latter from 
exporting to the US and denying it the possibility of preferential treatment under the 
Generalised System of Preferences introduced under the Trade Act of 1974. The Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1961 served to prohibit non-humanitarian assistance to communist 
countries, and following North Korea's 1988 bombing of Korean Air Lines Flight 858, the 
country was added to the State Sponsors of Terrorism list under the Export Administration 
Act of 1979, bringing further sanctions on trade, travel and financial transactions. Inclusion 
on the list also required the US to oppose economic assistance to North Korea from the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.
3
   
 
In the 1990s, North Korea's deepening humanitarian crisis, the Agreed Framework reached 
in 1994 following the nuclear crisis, and Pyongyang's agreement to a moratorium on 
missile testing in 1999 all led to a relaxation of US sanctions against the country. However, 
renewed tensions over the North's nuclear programme in the 2000s led the George W. Bush 
administration to impose further sanctions, including financial sanctions. As noted, US 
Treasury accusations against Macao's Banco Delta regarding its involvement in North 
Korean counterfeiting and money laundering activities led financial institutions around the 
world to avoid dealings with North Korea. A temporary breakthrough following the 
February 13th Agreement in 2007 at the Six-Party Talks along with Pyongyang's 
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subsequent move to disable its Yongbyon nuclear facilities led the US to remove North 
Korea from its State Sponsors of Terrorism list in October 2008. However, with North 
Korea's repeated missile and nuclear tests since 2009, the US has applied a range of  "smart 
sanctions" on individuals and organisations suspected of involvement in arms and drug 
trafficking (OFAC 2016). Finally, on the 1st of June 2016, the US Treasury labelled the 
entire jurisdiction of North Korea as a money laundering concern, a move that requires US 
banks to implement additional due diligence measures to ensure that they do not do 
business directly with North Korean companies or indirectly through front companies. 
 
In the post-Cold War era, North Korea has also been subject to multilateral UN Security 
Council (UNSC) resolutions. Following missile tests in July 2006, UNSC Resolution 1695 
called upon UN member states to prevent the transfer of missile and missile-related 
materials and technology to the country.
4
 Furthermore, as a result of North Korea's nuclear 
test the following October, Resolution 1718 banned the sale to North Korea of conventional 
arms and WMD-related materials as well as the provision of related technical training or 
assistance. It also banned North Korean exports of such items. Resolution 1718 also 
marked the increasing shift towards smart and financial sanctions, calling upon member 
states to freeze the assets of individuals and entities associated with North Korea's WMD 
programme as well as to impose a travel ban on associated personnel. The resolution 
authorised states to inspect cargo shipments for WMD-related materials, though with no 
obligation to do so and banned the export of dual-use and luxury goods to North Korea. 
 
Following North Korea's second nuclear test in May 2009, Resolution 1874 extended the 
ban on North Korean arms exports to all arms and related assistance. Member states were 
allowed to export small arms to North Korea, but only with prior notification to the 
Security Council. The Resolution also obliged member states to inspect and destroy all 
banned cargo to and from North Korea, whether on the high seas, in ports, or at airports, if 
they have reasonable grounds to suspect a violation. There were strengthened measures 
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aimed at preventing financial assistance to North Korea's WMD programme, and member 
states and international financial institutions were called upon not to enter into new 
commitments for grants, financial assistance, or concessional loans to North Korea, except 
for "humanitarian and developmental purposes", or for the promotion of denuclearisation.  
 
In 2013, two further resolutions, 2087 and 2094, were passed in response to the 12th of 
December 2012 missile test and the 12th of February 2013 third nuclear test respectively. 
Resolution 2087 strengthened previous resolutions by clarifying the right of states to seize 
and destroy WMD-related materials suspected of heading to and from North Korea. It also 
called for increased monitoring of individuals and financial institutions in their own 
territories engaged in North Korean-related activities. Resolution 2094 imposed further 
sanctions on North Korean banking, travel, and trade. Finally, in March 2016, the UNSC 
passed resolution 2270 in response to the latter’s nuclear and missile tests earlier that year. 
The sanctions included mandatory inspections of cargo shipments entering and leaving 
North Korea, the prohibition of sales of all conventional weapons to the country including 
small arms, a ban on North Korean exports of coal, iron ore, gold, and other mineral 
products, and a ban on sales of jet fuel to the country. However, potential buyers are only 
obligated to turn back shipments of minerals when there are grounds to believe that the 
proceeds would benefit North Korea's military, raising questions regarding the levels of 
proof required. Furthermore, the sanctions do not affect trade being conducted for 
“livelihood and humanitarian purposes,” leaving a great deal of discretion to countries such 
as China as to how far to enforce the ban on North Korean mineral exports (Babson 2016).  
 
Japanese and South Korean bilateral sanctions have also had significant implications for 
North Korea's external economic relations. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
Japan became North Korea’s second largest trade partner after China, with annual bilateral 
trade reaching approximately US$ 400-500 million in the 1990s, amounting to around 25 
percent of North Korea’s total external trade (Eberstadt 1996, pp.523–524). However, Kim 
Jong Il’s public admission during his 2002 summit with Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro 
Koizumi that North Korea had kidnapped 11 Japanese citizens in the late 1970s and early 
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1980s led the Japanese government to halt its humanitarian assistance to the country later 
that year. Moreover, North Korea’s first nuclear test in 2006 led Tokyo to further 
strengthen sanctions against the country, including a ban on North Korean imports, the 
freezing of North Korean financial assets in Japan, the suspension of cash remittances, the 
imposition of stringent export controls on dual use technologies, and a ban on Japanese 
visits and charter flights and vessels to North Korea (International Crisis Group 2010, pp.3–
4). As a result, Japan's trade with North Korea saw a decline from US$ 464 million in 2000 
to a mere US$ 9 million in 2007. Furthermore, on the 18th of June 2009, following 
Pyongyang's second nuclear test, Tokyo imposed a complete embargo on exports to North 
Korea.  
 
Bilateral sanctions imposed by South Korea have been similarly stringent. For most of the 
post-war era, inter-Korean trade was non-existent. However, owing to the engagement 
strategy pursued by the South's Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Mu-Hyun governments, the volume 
of inter-Korean trade rose from US$ 333 million in 1999 to US$ 1.82 billion in 2008. An 
important feature of this growing trade was the rise of consignment-based processing (CBP) 
arrangements between South Korean manufacturers and North Korea, whereby the bulk of 
the materials used in the manufacturing process are supplied by South Korean companies as 
a result of inadequate industrial supply networks within North Korea itself. This CBP-based 
manufacturing grew sharply after the opening of the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC) in 
December 2004. However, the sinking of the Cheonan naval ship in 2010 led the Lee 
Myung-Bak government to enact the so-called "May 24th" measures, which included the 
banning of North Korean vessels from South Korean territorial waters and ports; the 
suspension of all inter-Korean trade with the exception of the KIC; the banning of all travel 
to the North by South Korean citizens, as well as the restriction of contacts with North 
Koreans, though again with the exception of the KIC; the banning of investment in new and 
ongoing cooperation projects in North Korea. Existing investments in the KIC were 
allowed to continue, but no new investments were permitted, and the number of South 
Korean personnel in the complex was to be restricted (Ministry of Unification 2010). From 
May 2010, inter-Korean trade consisted solely of the inflow of raw materials into the KIC 
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and the outflow of manufactured goods back to South Korea. However, following North 
Korea’s fourth nuclear test in January 2016, the South Korean authorities closed down the 
KIC, leading to an almost complete halt in inter-Korean economic exchange. 
 
As can be seen, North Korea has been subject to a stringent set of bilateral and multilateral 
sanctions. As Pyongyang's fourth and fifth nuclear tests in 2016 suggests, these sanctions 
have failed to achieve their explicit objective of inhibiting the country's nuclear ambitions. 
Furthermore, there is little evidence to suggest that they have had elicited any significant 
macroeconomic shock to the North Korean economy (Noland 2009). Indeed, the severe 
external shocks experienced by North Korea in recent years have resulted mainly from the 
end of the country's favourable trading relationships with the Soviet Union and China in the 
early 1990s rather than through decades-long international sanctions. Nonetheless, the 
stringent Japanese and South Korean sanctions combined with the more targeted UNSC 
sanctions alongside China’s lax enforcement of the latter have led to a re-orientation of 
North Korea's external economic relations towards China (Haggard & Noland 2013). As 
will be discussed below, this shift has facilitated the increasing importance of the Sino-
North Korean border economy and, as a consequence, the prominence of informal trade 
practices within North Korea’s external economic relations more broadly. In the following 
section, we provide an overview of the scope of this emerging border economy and the key 
actors involved, before going on to discuss the specific impact of financial sanctions. 
 
The Rise of the Sino-North Korean Border Economy 
 
The combined impact of bilateral and multilateral sanctions against North Korea has left 
China as the country's most important trade and investment partner. In 2003, North Korea's 
trade with China surpassed US$ 1 billion for the first time. By 2013, however, this bilateral 
trade had grown to US$ 6.54 billion. The share occupied by China in North Korea's 
external trade increased from 39 percent in 2006 to 57 percent in 2010.
5
  By 2013, North 
                                                 
5
 These figures include inter-Korean trade and are drawn from statistics released by the Korea Trade-
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14 
 
Korea's total external trade was estimated at US$ 8.48 billion, with China's share 
amounting to around 77 percent.
6
 However, as will be discussed below, the prominence of 
informal practices within Sino-North Korean economic exchange means that the actual 
scale of bilateral economic relations is likely to be far greater than these official statistics 
suggest. 
 
<Figure 1 near here> 
 
A noticeable feature of this growth in bilateral trade has been the increase in North Korean 
exports of minerals, and to a lesser extent, clothing. The rise in North Korean mineral 
exports to China is a direct result of the latter's rapid economic growth and demand for 
natural resources alongside the associated global commodity boom. As shown in Figure 2, 
while anthracite had not been a major North Korean export prior to the mid-2000s, 
anthracite exports to China thereafter saw an annual increase of 190 percent, reaching a 
value of US$ 1.14 billion in 2011. In addition, there have been increasing exports of North 
Korea's rich reserves of iron ore, gold and copper. This rapid increase in mineral exports to 
China underlines how sanctions have contributed towards the restructuring of North 
Korea’s external economic relations in a manner that resembles the mineral export 
dependent seen in other developing countries' relations with China (Lee & Gray 2016).  
 
While North Korea's mineral export earnings have since 2014 seen a downturn as a result 
of the end of the global commodity boom, North Korean apparel exports (HS codes 61-62) 
to China have continued to grow, from a value of US$ 186 million in 2010 to US$ 799 
million in 2015. The share of apparel in North Korea's total exports to China has increased 
from 15.7 percent to 32.2 percent during the same period. The bulk of this increase has 
                                                                                                                                                    
since 2010, inter-Korean trade has been centred around the Kaesong Industrial Complex and consists mainly 
of the inflow of raw materials and outflow of CBP-based figures, thereby elevating the trade figures.  
If inter-Korean trade is excluded, China's share in North Korea’s foreign trade was estimated to reach 89.1 
percent in 2013, while further rising to 90.1 percent in 2014 and 91.3 percent in 2015.  
6
 In 2015, China's recorded total share of North Korea's external trade seemingly declined to 63.7 per cent, 
though this is closely related to the fact that Chinese Customs stopped recording crude oil exports to North 
Korea in 2014. With the closure of the Kaesong Industrial Complex and thus all North-South trade, China's 
share of North Korea's total external trade is likely to increase significantly in 2016. 
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been driven by outsourcing from Chinese companies through CBP arrangements, thereby 
reflecting the emergence of labour shortages and rising wages in China's own apparel sector 
in recent years. However, South Korean bilateral sanctions have also played a role. 
Following Seoul's May 24th sanctions, Chinese companies took over much of the CBP-
based trade in apparel from South Korean companies who were banned from engaging in 
North Korean production outside of the KIC. Some of the Chinese companies and 
merchants that had previously acted as intermediaries between Southern firms and Northern 




<Figure 2 near here> 
 
Beyond machinery and materials used in mining and apparel production, the kind of goods 
that China exports to North Korea ranges from basic necessities and foodstuff to industrial 
equipment and crude oil. Although North Korean imports of Chinese grain have declined in 
recent years as a result of the partial recovery of its agricultural sector, North Korea has 
increased imports of machinery parts, electrical equipment, vehicles, plastic products, and 
chemical goods from China. Since the late 2000s, North Korea has also increased its 
imports of building materials as a result of the government's modernisation and 
homebuilding efforts in several major cities. Imported Chinese goods are also being used 
for the restoration of production and transport facilities. This influx reflects ongoing 
processes of marketisation within the North Korean economy, whereby China-sourced 
goods are supplying the country's burgeoning informal markets (Smith 2009). Furthermore, 
despite widespread negative perceptions regarding North Korea’s investment environment 
(Jung & Rich 2015), Chinese firms have invested in export-oriented mining and apparel 
sectors as well as manufacturing for the local market and in services. Official data provided 
by China's Ministry of Commerce estimates that Chinese investment in North Korea has as 
a result reached an annual level of US$ 100 million in recent years (PRC Ministry of 
                                                 
7
 Interviews with Chinese firm owners engage in trade business and CBP (November 2012, March 2013 and 
July 2016 in Dandong and Shenyang). 
16 
 
Commerce 2014, p.132), though as with trade, actual levels of investment are likely to be 
higher than these official statistics suggest. 
 
<Figure 3 near here> 
 
The fact that the Chinese government condones and even promotes this border trade with 
weak regulatory oversight has been a key factor in the manifest ineffectiveness of the 
multilateral sanctions regime (Oh & Ryu 2011; Noland 2009; C. Jones 2015; Whitty et al. 
2006; Kim & Martin-Hermosillo 2013). In terms of motivations, it has been argued that 
Beijing's engagement with North Korea reflects growing China-US strategic competition in 
East Asia alongside a desire for a buffer state on China's northeastern borders (Ji 2001, 
p.398; Moore 2008). However, the Chinese government has also sought to encourage the 
growth of cross-border exchange as a means of revitalising its less-developed border 
regions, and in this sense, Beijing's approach to economic relations with North Korea 
shares much in common with its approach to other border regions. Trading companies and 
merchants in key Liaoning and Jilin provincial border cities, for example, receive 
preferential treatment from the Chinese authorities in terms of import duty reduction as 
well as the government’s allocation for export quotas and state licenses for controlled 
"strategic goods" such as grain, flour, coke and petroleum products (Hong 2006, p.197; 
Kim & Jung 2015, p.28). The Chinese authorities have also made significant investments in 
border infrastructure to further facilitate the growing cross-border exchange. Though 
diplomatic relations have cooled in recent years due to tensions surrounding Pyongyang's 
nuclear programme, this emphasis on economic cooperation has not subsided despite the 
seemingly slow progress of some key projects, particularly in the Dandong city region. This 
proactive role of the Chinese state in promoting the cross-border economy reflects the fact 
that while North Korea accounts for a relatively small proportion of China's overall trade, 
China's northeastern border cities have increasingly benefited from the cross-border 
exchange. For example, about 40 percent of Dandong’s foreign trade takes place with 




In terms of the entities involved, there has been a shift from the situation until the 1990s 
when border trading rights for local firms and residents were tightly controlled by the 
provincial authorities and the trade itself conducted largely by SOEs. With Beijing's easing 
of restrictions on cross-border trade in the early 2000s, the number of private firms 
engaging in the North Korean trade has risen sharply. Again, in the case of Dandong, there 
are around 6,700 registered trading companies, with more than a third of these estimated to 
be involved in economic exchange with North Korea.
8
 Several of these companies have 
grown from small private traders to become major companies dealing with the large-scale 
import and export of coal, metals, fertiliser, foodstuff, machinery, vehicles and building 
materials.
9
 A good example of this is Dandong Hongxiang Industrial Development 
Corporation. Established in January 2000, this company emerged as one of North Korea's  
most prominent trading partners, reporting an annual trade volume of US$ 100 million in 
recent years. There are also many smaller-scale Chinese traders and merchants based in 
Liaoning and Jilin provinces involved in various types of trade and investment activities. 
Some of these act as trade agents for North Korean firms and for Chinese enterprises in 
other provinces. Thus, while the Chinese and North Korean governments have encouraged 
the development of this cross-border economy, the majority of the entities involved are 
profit-seeking private businesses, thus displaying a marked contrast to the politicised 
pattern of inter-Korean economic cooperation (Haggard & Noland 2013, p.555).  
 
On the North Korean side, the principle actors are state-owned trading companies and 
agents working for factories and distribution organizations, reflecting the fact that North 
Korea officially still maintains its Soviet-style system of foreign trade licences and quotas. 
However, with the collapse of the central planning mechanism, trading firms and their 
agents have increasingly used their trading rights to operate individual firms and engaging 
in commercial activities with Chinese enterprises in order to sell imported goods on the 
domestic market. Moreover, considerable numbers of private traders and merchants have 
taken up positions in trade firms or state-owned enterprises, wearing a "red cap" so to speak,  
                                                 
8
 Interviews with local government officials, Dandong City, November 2012. 
9
 Interviews with the managing staff of several trading companies in Dandong, November 2012 and July 2016. 
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in order to conduct foreign trade with China and to increase domestic business 
opportunities (Kim & Yang 2014). Production facilities and state-owned stores in North 
Korea are also sold or rented out to emerging rich entrepreneurs, known as donju. These 
donju businesses range from money-lending, foreign currency sales and restaurants to 
wholesale, construction, manufacturing, mining, and transportation businesses. Indeed, this 
recent emergence of an entrepreneurial class has both been tolerated by the regime and 
even promoted by new economic management policies under the Kim Jong Un government. 
These policies have conferred greater managerial rights on enterprises and discretion over 
purchase and trade in raw materials, the sales of output, recruitment of workers, and the 
utilisation of profits (Gray & Lee 2017; Yang 2016). In this sense, the growing border trade 
with China reflects and contributes to the broader double-edged sword of marketisation 
within North Korea. While the expansion of economic exchange with China and growth of 
profit-seeking private activities has increased the revenues and necessary materials accrued 
to the North Korean state, they have also contributed towards the growth of private 
economic forces and increasing social differentiation within North Korea. Though the 
interests of the state and individuals engaging in private economic activities have at times 
been in contradiction with each other, as seen during the 2009 currency reform, the Kim 
Jong Un government appears to have a relatively stable and increasingly symbiotic 
relationship with marketising processes in North Korea (Yang 2016).  
 
As we have argued, while the Chinese central and local governments have sought to 
promote border trade with North Korea, the key agents on the Chinese side have been 
profit-seeking private economic actors who have for the most part engaged in informal 
practices outside of the oversight of the state. On the North Korean side, official entities 
such as trading companies and even the banks themselves resorting to the use of informal 
methods. In the following section, we will first provide a qualitative overview of informal 
economic practices in the cross-border region and how these have been shaped by the 





Informal Dimensions of Sino-North Korean Border Economy 
 
Stringent South Korean and Japanese sanctions along with the more targeted UN Security 
Council sanctions and Beijing's lax enforcement of the latter have led to a shift in emphasis 
in North Korea's external economic relations towards China. Given the long land border 
between China and North Korea, this geo-economic shift has increased the prominence of 
informal trade activities such as smuggling, barter, and the widespread use of cash 
transactions. To simply reduce practices such as smuggling entirely to sanctions evasion 
would, however, be an over-simplification. Widespread border smuggling dates back at 
least to the economic collapse and famine of the 1990s, when North Korean smugglers 
bartered scrap metals, copper, seafood, antiques and other goods in exchange for food and 
basic necessities. The latter were then smuggled into North Korea, often with the 
cooperation of the North Korean authorities (Son 2007, pp.35–37). However, in the early 
2000s, the Chinese government strengthened its policing of its land and river borders with 
North Korea, as could be seen in the installation of barbed wire, the increased supervision 
by border guards, and the strengthening of penalties imposed on smugglers. As a result, 
Chinese trading companies and merchants became increasingly reluctant to engage in large-
scale smuggling across the Sino-North Korean land border, though small-scale smuggling 
reportedly still takes place despite period crackdowns by the North Korean authorities (see 
Lee 2015). 
 
Nonetheless, widespread smuggling of goods into China continues to take place across the 
open waters of the Yellow Sea, often with the assistance of Chinese professional trafficking 
organisations.
10
 These smuggled goods include North Korean seafood and medicinal herbs, 
for which there has been increasing demand in China in recent years. Indeed, fishery 
products became a key North Korean export item in the late 1990s. While Japan had 
previously been the main market for such goods, this trade was reoriented towards China 
following Japanese sanctions. An analysis of Chinese customs data gives some indication 
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as to the extent of this smuggling. As shown in Figure 4, China’s official seafood imports 
from North Korea fell from US$ 261 million in 2004 to just US$ 29.9 million in 2007, 
though by 2014, this had seen a partial recovery to US$ 143 million. Given that at the same 
time the North Korean government placed emphasis on the development of the fishery 
sector, that Chinese investment in North Korean fish farms was rising, and that 
considerable amounts of North Korea-labelled seafood were reportedly being sold in 
northeast Chinese markets, these low official figures suggest that significant amounts of 
fishery products were being smuggled into China. Again, the primary motivation of this 
smuggling has not been to evade sanctions but to avoid China's strict quarantine procedures 
required for fishery products. Nonetheless, the broader reorientation of North Korea's 
seafood trade towards China as a result of Japanese and South Korean sanctions has 
increased the role of smuggling in North Korea's broader external economic relations. 
 
<Figure 4 near here> 
 
Smuggling also continues to take place at official customs points along the land border, and 
has increased in line with the growth in trade overall. Merchants from both countries take 
advantage of lax customs inspections in border cities such as Dandong, Hunchun, Tumen, 
and Ji'an. Limited manpower at Chinese customs points means that typically only about one 
cargo vehicle in ten goes through any kind of inspection, with inspections usually taking 
the form of a simple visual check. Here, however, the link with sanctions is more direct. 
While false declarations are made for the purposes of tax evasion and the avoidance of 
burdensome customs, they are also made for the purposes of evading sanctions on dual use 
and luxury goods. In order to export such goods into North Korea, Chinese traders 
frequently make false customs declarations and load undeclared and prohibited goods onto 
container trucks together with permitted goods.
11
 Furthermore, the expansion of the Sino-
                                                 
11
 Chinese merchants and trade agents interviewed in both Yanji in Jilin Province and Dandong in Liaoning 
Province discussed these lax customs inspections and informal customs practices during in-depth interviews. 
The loading of undeclared goods and equipment onto the vehicles are also frequently carried out by owners 
and staffs of Chinese firms investing in North Korean mines and engaged in CBP-based clothing 
manufacturing in North Korea. 
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North Korean cross-border economy has been coupled with the increasing visits of North 
Koreans along with the growing movement of materials to border cities of Liaoning and 
Jilin. When returning from China, North Koreans often carry significant amounts of luxury 
goods as well as concealed foreign currency in their personal luggage without making the 
requisite customs declarations. Such luxury goods include everyday consumer items such 
as cameras, TVs and computers, and are often brought into the country to be sold in North 
Korean markets.  
 
As can be seen then, bilateral and multilateral sanctions have directly and indirectly led to 
evasive strategies across the Sino-North Korean border. A key question then is how 
specifically sanctions have impacted upon modes of trade settlement. Settlement across the 
Sino-North Korean border primarily takes place through two mechanisms. As noted above, 
cross-border trade during the 1990s frequently took the form of barter, though much of this 
was eventually monetised as the array of both goods and actors became increasingly 
diverse (Haggard et al. 2012, p.131). Barter has, however, remained a key feature of cross-
border trade settlement. Interviewed Chinese merchants reported, for example, that they 
would normally receive around 80 percent of payment for their exports in cash with the 
remaining 20 percent is paid for with goods from North Korea due to the latter's shortage of 
hard currency. These imported goods would typically include mineral resources, seafood, 
and agricultural products, which are then sold in the domestic Chinese market. Furthermore 
the scope of this barter trade can be quite large. According to one Chinese interviewee, in 
May 2009, a Chinese trading company provided a North Korean partner with corn in 
exchange for 100,000 tons of coal, which was then shipped to Shandong Province. 
Needless to say, this barter trade takes place without the requisite customs declaration and 
the involvement of financial institutions, thus remaining hidden from the official China 
Customs statistics. 
 
Cash payment, however, forms the most common form of trade settlement. While smaller 
scale trade tends to be conducted in Renminbi, both Chinese and North Korean traders 
typically prefer larger scale trade to be settled in US dollars or in Euros. The use of cash is 
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encouraged by several factors. First, North Korea's poor regulatory environment means that 
much Sino-North Korean trade takes the form of spot trading of goods rather than through 
more typical methods of letters of credit and foreign exchange remittances via banks. This 
helps Chinese traders negotiate the risk of arbitrary changes in rules and practices as well as 
the lack of a reliable mechanism of dispute resolution (Haggard et al. 2012, p.132). A 
further reason why official bank transfers are not used is that China's foreign exchange 
rules do not allow individuals to transfer more than US$ 50,000 per year overseas without 
permission from the relevant financial authorities. In addition, foreign exchange regulations 
stipulate that when a private enterprise opens a bank account for the purposes of conducting 
foreign trade, the financial institution is required to evaluate the enterprise's financial 
accounts and examine supporting trade documents before allowing the transfer of money 
out of the country. 
 
That this poor regulatory environment has encouraged informal methods of trade settlement 
is not surprising. It is important to note, however, that financial sanctions have further 
encouraged the use of informal methods of trade settlement as an evasive strategy. The 
predominance of the US in the global financial system amidst the growing "weaponisation 
of finance" has meant even before the US Treasury took overt actions against financial 
institutions dealing with North Korea, the Pyongyang authorities adopted defensive 
measures that created strong disincentives for traders to use the official banking system. In 
an attempt to reduce its dependence on US dollar-based international payment system, 
North Korea has since 2002 adopted the Euro as its official trading currency. A 
consequence of this is that when a North Korean firm requests a Korean bank to make a 
money transfer to a Chinese partner, the Pyongyang office of that bank first has to make a 
conversion into Euros before contacting its branches in China. The Chinese branch then 
duplicates the process by converting Euros into Dollars or Renminbi before making the 
payment to the Chinese enterprise. Unsurprisingly, this results in excessive bank fees being 
charged. One Chinese merchant cited an example of fees amounting to US$ 500 being 
charged on a remittance of US$ 6,000 from North Korea. Traders also complain about the 
slowness of the official banking transfer system. It typically takes a minimum of three to 
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seven working days and, in some cases, more than fifteen days for Chinese enterprises to 
receive payments from North Korea into their local bank accounts in China.
12
 These high 
fees and the complicated system of bank transfers of foreign exchange between the two 
countries thus further encourages the reliance on cash for trade settlements instead. 
 
Even when the official banking system is used, the growing use of financial sanctions has 
meant that bank transactions do not necessarily take place separately from the informal 
cash economy. In contrast to ordinary international financial remittances, when Chinese 
enterprises receive payments for exports through a North Korean financial institution, many 
remittances occur not through the use of wire transfer between banking institutions but 
through the physical transfer of cash from the headquarter office of the North Korean bank 
in Pyongyang to its branch office in China.
13
 Thus, when North Korean importers request a 
financial institution such as Kwangson Bank in Pyongyang to make a payment to a Chinese 
company, the Pyongyang headquarters of the bank simply asks its Dandong branch office 
to pay the company. An undeclared physical transfer of cash then takes place between the 
bank's headquarters in Pyongyang and its branch in China (Lee 2011, p.109). The bank in 
Pyongyang thus physically sends parcels of Chinese renminbi and dollars to their 
representative offices in Dandong. As noted, however, the settlement of trade through 
North Korean and Chinese financial institutions remains at a low level. Although there is 
no official data on foreign currency flows between China and North Korea, a survey 
conducted by the People’s Bank of China reported that in 2006 reported that only 21 
percent of exports from the Dandong region were settled via bank accounts designated for 
China-North Korea trade (Finance Association of Liaoning Province 2008, p.161). 
Furthermore, Kim and Jung’s (Kim & Jung 2015) study of Chinese firms in Dandong 
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 Based on interviews with Chinese merchants in Dandong, November 2012. 
13
 In the 2000s, the North Korean government reportedly opened representative offices of North Korean banks 
in several Chinese cities, including Beijing, Dalian and Shenyang, as well as in key border cities. In Dandong, 
representative offices were opened by Kwangson Bank, Hana Bank, Korea United Development Bank, and 
Koryo Bank. For example, Kwangson Bank, an affiliated financial institution of North Korea’s Foreign Trade 
Bank, reportedly established its representative office in Dandong in 2002. The function of its Dandong office 
was expanded to mainly dealing with trading companies and merchants in Chinese border regions in the mid-
2000s following the US Treasury’s action against the BDA in Macao. The Pyongyang government also 
established the Golden Triangle Bank in North Korea's Rason SEZ as well as a representative office in 
Hunchun, Jilin Province, as a means of promoting Chinese investment into the zone. 
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shows that only 15 percent of 176 surveyed firms used the official banking system for trade 
settlement with North Korea. Instead, 59 percent of firms used cash payment, 22 per cent 
used a mixture of cash and barter, and 4 percent relied solely on barter.   
 
As can be seen, cash remains the preferred method of settling Sino-North Korean trade, 
thus placing the bulk of the border trade settlement beyond the reach of financial sanctions. 
This is the case even with transactions amounting to the value of hundreds of thousands of 
US dollars.
14
 North Korean firms and government agencies purchase products in Chinese 
border city markets through cash payments either directly or via Chinese intermediaries.
15
 
Ethnic Chinese traders from North Korea are also able to bring Chinese goods to North 
Korean markets through cash payments with the help of relatives or other contacts residing 
in China. In addition to Chinese importers, companies and merchants investing in North 
Korean mining and engaging in CBP-based outsourcing also tend to make cash payments to 
their North Korean partners to avoid the use of official financial institutions. This 
preference for cash payments means that large amounts of currency are physically carried 
across the border, often by the staff of North Korean trading companies or government 
agencies. However, a certain portion of the cash paid for North Korean imports or CBP-
related fees typically remains in China as operating funds for North Korean firms or for the 
purchase of additional Chinese goods. Some of these funds are likely to be deposited into 
the accounts of North Korean companies or their Chinese intermediaries held at Chinese 
banks. Again, such methods help to evade financial sanctions, with the funds being 
deposited for future use by the North Korean authorities when needed. 
 
As can be seen, bilateral Japanese and South Korean sanctions have increased North 
Korea's reliance on China as its key economic partner. The fact that UN multilateral 
sanctions have been less stringent and that China has in any case been more lax in its 
                                                 
14
 Interviews with Chinese merchants engaging in trading business with North Korea on several occasions in 
June 2009, April 2011 and November 2012. 
15
 Chinese intermediaries are individuals who reside in Chinese bordering regions and work for North Korean 
trading companies or government agencies. These intermediaries often engage in cash transfers between 
Chinese importers and North Korean firms, and by doing so, receive a commission. 
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enforcement of them has meant there have been increased opportunities for traders on both 
sides of the border to engage in informal evasive practices. The growing prevalence of 
financial sanctions has led to the failure of the cross-border banking system to develop in 
line with the expansion of cross-border trade and investment. As we argue in the next 
section, while the growing informal cross-border economy has been of increasing concern 
to the Chinese authorities, attempts to encourage traders' use of the official banking system 
has increasingly come into conflict with Beijing's concerns regarding the explicit targeting 
by the US Treasury of banks doing business with North Korea. 
 
Financial Sanctions and Regulation of the Cross-Border Economy 
 
Given that informal trade and investment practices tend to impede the monitoring of flows 
and statistical reporting and facilitates smuggling and tax evasion (Reilly 2014, p.929), 
there have been increased attempts by the Chinese authorities at improving the official 
cross-border financial system. Though the Chinese government traditionally maintained 
stringent restrictions on the flow of Renminbi outside of China, in 2003 Beijing adopted a 
policy of encouraging the use of the official banking system in border trade through 
allowing the Renminbi to be used in cross-border trade valuation and settlement. This was 
achieved initially through enacting the "Management Measures for Foreign Exchange in 
Border Trade," the aim of which was to encourage the settlement of trade through utilising 
China's regional commercial banks and the banking systems of neighbouring countries. In 
October 2004, the Chinese and North Korean central banks thus signed "the Agreement on 
the Settlement of Payment between the People’s Bank of China and the Central Bank of the 
Democratic People's Republic of Korea." Based on this agreement, in April 2005, the 
representative office of North Korea’s Kwangson Bank in Dandong was permitted to 
operate exclusive bank accounts that would allow Chinese enterprises and merchants doing 
business with North Korea to settle trade in Renminbi, US dollars, Euros, Japanese yen or 
Hong Kong dollars. In 2006, similar accounts were set up at a branch office of China 
Construction Bank at Dandong, one of China's major state-owned commercial banks. As 
such, it became possible to transfer money from China to North Korea to pay for imports, 
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CBP-related fees, and to send investment-related funds to  business accounts at a specified 
North Korean bank in Pyongyang (Finance Association of Liaoning Province 2008, 
pp.160–162). 
 
However, attempts by the Chinese government to regularise cross-border financial 
transactions have been increasingly undermined by international financial sanctions 
imposed both on North Korean banks and on foreign banks involved in financial dealings 
with North Korea. As noted above, the action against BDA had a chilling effect on the 
willingness of Chinese and international banks to business with the bank. More recently, 
the US has imposed sanctions on North Korean banks directly, which has served to 
undermine the willingness of Chinese banks to do business with North Korean financial 
institutions. Following the adoption of UNSC Resolution 1874, the US Treasury provided a 
list of North Korean banks suspected of deploying "deceptive financial practices." In 
August 2009, it added Kwangson Bank to this list. Although the measure ostensibly applied 
only to US citizens and to foreigners based in the US, its overall result was the further 
isolation of North Korean banks from the international banking system. Furthermore, in 
March 2013, following UNSC Resolution 2094, the US Treasury Department put in place 
sanctions against North Korea's Foreign Trade Bank (FTB), the key North Korean 
institution in charge of foreign banking transactions and foreign exchange. The fact that 
these latter sanctions targeted North Korea's main foreign exchange bank distinguished the 
action from previous financial sanctions. As has been argued, due to the dollar's status as 
the world's reserve currency and the fact that it accounts for over 85 per cent of the world's 
foreign exchange transactions, banks are more or less compelled to make use of a US-based 
dollar payment system, meaning also that their transactions have to go through a US bank. 
The US Treasury's demand that US banks refrain from conducting business with the FTB 
means that other foreign banks will also stay clear of it (The Hankyoreh 2013). 
 
Spurred by their own risk assessments, four major state-owned Chinese banks subsequently 
cut ties with the FTB. The Chinese authorities also reportedly shut down the Dandong 
branch of North Korea's Kwangson Bank (Wertz 2013, pp.75–76). The overall impact of 
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these actions on North Korea’s ability to engage in financial dealings with the outside 
world has been marked. Even UN agencies and European NGOs conducting humanitarian 
work in North Korea have been affected, as many of these organisations had relied on 
Chinese or European banks to make transfers to the FTB for routine payments related to 
their work. Indeed, many banks now avoid doing business with the FTB due to reputational 
risk (Wertz 2013, pp.76–77). Furthermore, in March 2013, just ten days after the passing of 
UNSC Resolution 2094, Beijing imposed a freeze on certain transactions by the Dandong 
branch of the China Construction Bank. The CCB has had strong ties with Kwangson Bank 
since 2008, when Kwangson Bank opened a trade settlement account denominated in 
Chinese Renminbi at the Dandong branch of the China Construction Bank (Zhang 2012, 
p.40). 
 
As such, despite the Chinese government's earlier efforts to expand the use of official 
financial institutions, settlement of Sino-North Korean trade through financial institutions 
has remained limited. The CCB reported that there were only 235 cases of border trade 
settlements with North Korea in the first half of 2012, amounting in total to just US$ 33.3 
million. This represents a decline of 39 per cent over the same period the year before 
(Zhang & Jin 2012). As a result, following intensification of international sanctions, the 
North Korean government has increasingly relied on secretive financial transactions as an 
evasive measure. For example, following North Korea's third nuclear test in early 2013, the 
representative office of North Korea’s Kwangson Bank was reportedly shut down by the 
Chinese government, and following North Korea's fourth nuclear test in 2016, Chinese 
banks were reported to have closed down bank accounts held under North Korean names 
(Donga Daily 2016). In the meantime, however, North Korea has sought to evade financial 
sanctions through utilising Chinese intermediaries (Park 2014). These have been used to set 
up personal bank accounts on behalf of North Koreans in Chinese banks. It has been 
reported that there were around 70 North Korean dummy corporations based in China in 
2012 for the purposes of facilitating illegal business transactions, with around 150 to 170 
associated illegal bank accounts (Kim & Shin 2012). At the request of their North Korean 
partners, some Chinese enterprises engaged in business with North Korea make payments 
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to Chinese bank accounts belonging to North Korean enterprises or Chinese intermediaries, 
rather than transferring payments to North Korea directly. As Chinese intermediaries 
convert the payment in cash and hand it over to the relevant North Korean agents, the North 
Korean authorities are thereby able to evade the financial tracking of the Chinese banking 




The manifest failure of financial sanctions to induce North Korea to abandon its nuclear 
weapons programme is perhaps not surprising given the nature of the North Korean regime 
and its unwavering commitment to developing WMD. Our focus here has, however, been 
on the prior question of why such sanctions do not appear to have exerted any significant 
macroeconomic pressure on the country and how financial sanctions have conversely 
contributed towards the deepening the role of informal trade settlement practices in North 
Korea's broader external economic relations. Sino-North Korean economic exchange has 
been increasingly characterised by the widespread use of cash and barter as a means of 
trade settlement. North Korean traders have actively utilised secretive methods in order to 
avoid using the official financial system to carry out transactions. Chinese trading 
companies and investors in the border regions have also adapted to such business methods, 
utilising informal customs and practices to evade sanctions as well as minimise expenses 
and engage in tax evasion. Pre-emptive measures taken by the North Korean authorities to 
avoid financial sanctions, such as the adoption of the Euro as the country's official foreign 
exchange currency, have added to the cumbersome nature of cross-border financial 
transfers, further encouraging resort to the use of cash and barter in trade settlement. 
Furthermore, attempts to regularise cross-border economic exchange by the Chinese 
authorities have been adversely affected by financial sanctions, meaning that such informal 





Questions can, of course, be raised about how representative the North Korean case may be 
and whether the lessons learnt here can be more widely generalised. Contextual factors 
such as China's lax enforcement of multilateral sanctions have often been cited as a 
fundamental weakness in the international sanctions regime directed at North Korea. As 
noted, however, a key claim of the financial sanctions literature is that such measures are 
capable of forcing compliance where conventional trade sanctions fail to do so. Financial 
sanctions have indeed been highly effective in forcing the Chinese financial sector to break 
its dealings with North Korean entities. As we have argued, however, such measures have 
done little to temper the growth of informal trade and investment relations between the two 
countries, and as a result, have done little to put any serious degree of pressure on the North 
Korean regime. This may have much to do with the geo-economic specificities of the Sino-
North Korean border, which has played an important role in enabling actors on both sides 
of the border to resort to informal methods of trade and investment as a means of evading 
sanctions. As such, we suggest that analyses of the efficacy of financial sanctions need to 
be sensitive to specificities such as the precise combination of conventional and trade 
sanctions, the spatial dimensions of the target state's existing and potential external 
economic partners, and the willingness and capacity of third countries to enforce sanctions. 
At the very least, however, we argue that the North Korean case suggests that the new-
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Figure 1. North Korea’s Trade with China, South Korea and Japan 
(Unit: Million US$) 
 
Sources: Drawn from Chinese and Japanese customs data and from the South Korean Ministry of Unification. 
Note: North Korean data between August and November 2009 has not been appeared in statistics of China 
Customs. It can be therefore assumed that trade this year in reality either continued as normal or 
increased. There is also an export data omission of crude oil in China’s official trade statistics for an 




Figure 2. North Korea’s Major Exports to China 
(Unit: USD 1,000) 
 
Source: China Customs data drawn from the Korea International Trade Association (KITA.NET) database. 
Note: the data of coal is drawn from HS Code 2701; the data of iron ores is from HS Code 2601; the data of 









Figure 3. North Korea’s Major Imports from China 
(Unit: USD 1,000) 
 
Source: China Customs data drawn from KITA.NET database. 





Figure 4. China’s Imports of North Korean Seafood 
 (Unit: USD 1,000) 
 
Source: China Customs from the KITA.NET database (www.kita.net). 
Note: The data of total fishery are based on HS Code 03; the data of crustaceans is drawn from HS Code 0306, 
the data of molluscs is from HS Code 0307. 
 
